The United States has been massing naval forces off Iran’s shores. Since November the media has been filled with rumors about an imminent military strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. How might this potential war differ from past U.S. operations against Iraq and Yugoslavia, and what will they have in common? What might be the objectives and the results of such an attack?
Non-contact warfare
Any U.S. attack will likely aim to minimize contact as much as possible. It will involve air strikes and cruise missile attacks aided by detailed information from reconnaissance and the broad superiority it boasts in terms of control over its units in a wartime theater of operation.
The U.S. and its allies are unlikely to get involved in a ground operation. The United States does not have the power or the internal political support for it. Iran is a very formidable rival and it will be extremely hard to fight against it on the ground (compared to Iraq in 1991 or 2003). It would be political suicide for Obama to risk having more soldiers return in coffins before the November elections.
For this reason alone, a ground invasion is off the table, with the possible exception of operations carried out by special forces, who may conduct in-depth reconnaissance of Iran’s territory, locate targets and sabotage critical facilities.
Aviation would bear the brunt of the burden of this non-contact warfare. This would be a hit-and-run air war. In light of the awkward air campaign of its French and British allies in Libya, the United States may show the world what it has mastered in a little less than a decade since the Iraq War began in 2003.
It was in 2003 that the United States began using Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) – a cheap guidance kit that converts conventional bombs into precision weapons. It was also at that time that it began switching to integrated systems of control, targeting and information – the concept of network-centric warfare. The roles of drones increased as well.
Iran may expect something vaguely similar to NATO’s operation in Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999. The strikes on Iraq in 1993 and 1998 were very limited and were actually punitive in nature. The air blitzes in 1991 and 2003 were meant primarily to pave the way for subsequent ground operations.
However, as distinct from European Yugoslavia, which had to be crushed politically, in Iran the United States will have to carry out targeted strikes to destroy the country’s military and industrial capabilities. Iran will not surrender after a couple of heavy blows; it will only get mad.
The experience of air operations in Yugoslavia and Iraq suggests that air defense systems, airfields and ballistic missiles bases will be the first targets as well as the Iranian navy and coastal launchers of anti-ship missiles. Later the emphasis may be switched to critical oil, energy and fuel facilities.
The fuel industry may become a key target. While Iran is an oil exporter, it has long suffered from shortages of gasoline, buying up to 45% of its gasoline from its Gulf neighbors. In 2009 and 2010 it managed to produce enough oil products for strictly rationed domestic consumption, but the Iran’s weak refining capabilities continues to stifle economic growth.
And, of course, there’s the matter of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. It will be destroyed with particular zeal and not necessarily by the first attacks.
The Natanz plant and the unfinished reactor near Arak may get their share of smart bombs. The operating reactor of the Bushehr nuclear power plant is unlikely to be attacked directly, but its supporting facilities may be put out of commission.
Fordo – a tough nut to crack
The most tempting target is located in the very heart of Persian power, not far from the holy city of Qom. This is an enrichment facility in Fordo, a giant fortified underground complex. Construction began in 2007 and it was put into service last year.
Now Iran has transferred all work on the production of uranium enriched to 19.75% to the Fordo facility. Previously it has been conducted in Natanz, but Iranian officials have acknowledged that it was not well protected from air strikes. The underground facility in Fordo is much better protected.
Israel regularly complains to Washington about its lack of air-to-ground munitions or “penetrators,” obviously hinting at a potential attack against Iran. The United States has an array of munitions for this job. The most monstrous of these is the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), weighting more than 13.5 tons. It is part of the strike arsenal of B-52 bombers and B-2 Stealth aircraft.
According to open sources, the GBU-57 can penetrate the ground to a depth of 60 meters and rock to a depth of up to 40 meters or even less in some cases. Meanwhile, U.S. experts believe that key elements of the Fordo facility are located about 80 meters or more below the surface.
Even advocates of air strikes have misgivings. Fordo seems a hard nut to crack. Experts believe that precision weapons can make multiple strikes on a single spot, but there is a simple argument against this – nobody knows the structure of the Fordo facility.
This is why the most a massive air attack on Fordo could achieve is to block surface exits, energy supply routes and the transport infrastructure. To achieve this it will be enough to use conventional JDAMs and Tomahawk cruise missiles, which are traditional for such warfare.
This approach will not help destroy Iran’s production capacity. More can be achieved only if the attackers are incredibly lucky, use tactical nuclear arms, or send a task force to seize the facility.
But luck cannot be planned. The use of tactical nuclear arms would destroy the Fordo facility but would create so many difficulties (both purely technical and in terms of the overarching strategy) that the game would not be worth the candle.
As for a task force, its success is also unpredictable. Moreover, any sabotage operation will require adequate weapons. The only more or less reliable weapon would be a suitcase nuke, but again the game wouldn’t be worth the candle.
Possible outcomes
We are getting an interesting picture. A ground operation against Iran is highly unlikely, and an occupation is altogether impossible. Massive air strikes may undermine Iran’s industrial capabilities but would prove unable to settle, once and for all, the nuclear issue.
A massive air attack on Iran would certainly delay its nuclear program. In this narrow sense, such an operation could be considered a success. However, it is more difficult to predict the potential impact of this crude military intervention in a regional power.
One thing is clear – the impact would not be positive. Such a blow at the rocky boat that is the Middle East could capsize it.
In this case incensed Islamic radicals will easily sweep away everything – the conservative Gulf monarchies (for their pro-American stance), the last secular regimes (in Syria, Jordan and Kuwait) and the weak transitional governments borne of revolution (in Egypt and Yemen).
Is it worth unleashing such destruction in the region, the world’s “soft underbelly,” in order to delay Tehran’s nuclear program by five or six years? The United States will hardly defeat Iran. The more likely result would be the inadvertent destruction of several decades of U.S. policy in the region.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s and may not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
