Military analysts have mixed feelings on Navy Day in Russia. True, the Navy is doing better than before, but not as well as we'd like. And we haven't even scratched the surface of a host of systemic naval problems.
Meanwhile, new stories on the Navy abound. Not all of them are good, but some are worth discussing. Let's start with the most important and obvious issue.
Ocean fleet mirages
At last year's International Maritime Defense Show in St. Petersburg, Roman Trotsenko, president of the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC), told journalists that design work on Russia's new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier will begin in 2016. Construction could be completed by 2023.
Trotsenko said Russia is also going to build nuclear-powered destroyers. In fact, these are missile-equipped escort cruisers for an air capable strike group. Commissioning such ships can drastically change the image of the Russian fleet by turning it into a genuine ocean-faring force.
Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov reacted calmly to this characterization, noting that Russia is conducting R&D on the new aircraft carrier and finding a place for it in the fleet but will not make a decision on construction before this initial phase is complete. Moreover, decisions on such issues are the prerogative of the country's top political leadership.
He said the state armaments program through 2020 does not provide for the construction of any aircraft carriers. This is perfectly understandable, because without modernizing Sevmash in Severodvinsk or building new dockyards on the Baltic (on the island of Kotlin, according to USC's plans) such projects are absolutely pointless.
It's fun to fantasize about nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, but they won't be enough to modernize squadrons. It would be much more realistic to build more of the ships that form the backbone of the Navy.
For example, there are the Project 22350 frigates, or the Admiral Gorshkov and its sister ship Admiral Kasatonov frigates. Construction of these ships has delayed again and again. These are strong but expensive ships. If our industry makes the necessary effort and receives regular funding, it could build 10 ships of this class, but this would all but exhaust the ship builders' capacity.
There are also less expensive alternatives to the Gorshkov - Project 11356M patrol ships, the younger brothers of the Indian frigates ordered in Russia. The Admiral Grigorovich is under construction. The Admiral Essen has been laid recently and another four similar ships are expected to be laid before the fall of 2012. Their purchase by the Russian fleet is more like a partial solution, but there doesn't seem to be an alternative - otherwise it will be impossible to increase the number of ships of this class.
There are also last-minute Project 20380 corvettes that incorporate cutting-edge stealth elements that significantly reduces its radar signature. The Steregushchy class ships are multi-role but their main mission is to protect territorial waters and economic interest zones, and to escort other ships.
All-purpose ships
It seems that the Navy is finally overcoming the Soviet-era incompatibility of weapon systems, when each project was armed and equipped anew. The new logic has produced the so-called UKSK - the multipurpose shipboard firing system. This is a modular weapon system designed to counter anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles as well as cruise missiles guided to surface targets. All these three types are part of the multi-purpose Kalibr system that may also be installed on submarines. A supersonic anti-ship cruise missile Onix will also become part of UKSK. Our designers and their Indian colleagues are developing the BrahMos missile on the basis of its export version Yakhont. Its perspective universal launchers may be equipped with air defense missiles.
Missile standardization is a smart tactical and economic measure. It will not only enhance the combat efficiency of the Navy but will also help the Defense Ministry to save considerable money on purchases, while the industry will be able to concentrate on standardized solutions.
Above and under water
The submarine fleet is in a difficult position. Construction of new Project 955 Borei ballistic missile submarines, equipped with the notorious Bulava missile, requires an enormous effort. Little progress has been made in decision-making on the building of the new generation Project 885 Yasen class nuclear-powered attack submarines after the commissioning of the Severodvinsk submarines.
There is no discussion of the designing and construction of the light and inexpensive nuclear-powered hunter to succeed the current submarines of the Projects 671RTM (K), 945 and 971, which are not going to last forever. It would be wrong to think that heavily armed Yasens will replace light hunters. It is impossible to build many submarines of this class because they are expensive and they won't cover all the gaps in our long submarine "fronts."
It is not quite clear what will happen with the Navy's air fleet. The Tupolev Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers, a menace to NATO squadrons, are being gradually phased out. Su-24 bombers will also become obsolete before long. Reports appeared about two weeks ago that the Navy may buy from the Irkut Corporation 12 heavy Su-30SM fighters equipped with Yakhont missiles to replace Su-24s. Regrettably, this is all the good news there is about the Navy's air fleet for now.
The need to face reality
Ship builders' Napoleonic plans are sometimes greatly at odd with how the defense order is carried out.
Indeed, Sevmash built the first Project 885 Severodvinsk submarine from the reserves of the 1990s. The budget paid 47 billion rubles for it at 2005 prices. According to Serdyukov, Sevmash fixed the price of 112 billion rubles for the next submarine of this class without batting an eyelid. There are serious problems with funding the purchase of submarine weapons - during public debates with Yury Solomonov, general designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering, Serdyukov complained about the growing prices of Bulava submarines.
There are also criminal cases. The recent embezzlement of funds allocated for the repairs of the Pyotr Veliky nuclear-powered cruiser has only emphasized the scale of the disorder that has been growing for years in shipbuilding and all the neglected naval repairs.
Nevertheless, Russia has already made some sensible decisions on upgrading its fleet. Suffice it to mention the cautious approach to new heavy warships, the rapid construction of medium-class ships for the Russian Navy on the basis of worked-out export projects and the long-awaited unification of naval armaments.
It seems that the Navy's leadership understands what needs to be done. Now it will have to decide how to do it. It should start by adjusting the defense order system so as to make pricing transparent and to guarantee strict quality control for supplied arms and equipment.
The views expressed in this article are the author's and may not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
