St. Petersburg hosted an extended meeting of the Russian Defense Ministry's Board on September 23, 2010, at which the establishment of new military districts and joint strategic commands was discussed. These are major components of the ongoing reform of the military.
The meeting's participants focused on establishment of the Western Military District, comprising the former Moscow and Leningrad military districts, as well as the Baltic and Northern Fleets. Although no details were available, the issue of "new-generation" military districts evokes great interest.
New districts in the making
It is not surprising that many analysts consider the establishment of new military districts and joint strategic commands to be among the main achievements of military reform. Plans to overhaul the "classic" military districts were discussed long ago, and initial efforts to establish entities similar to current joint strategic commands were made during Soviet times.
These organizational distinctions are similar to those of the leading Western countries, and they promote more effective and coordinated operations. Unlike the traditional command/headquarter system, they also reduce the chain of command.
Troop-control divisions of joint strategic commands are followed by operational command/inter-branch formations directly supervising military units in conflict zones which are the equivalent of old-time armies. Brigades, the primary "new-generation" operational-tactical units, are located on the lower tier of this pyramid.
Drawing any conclusions about the reform's results is premature at this point. First, other military districts and joint strategic-command divisions must be formed. Second, it takes time to build the well-coordinated operation of new formations, to accumulate and systematize experience, to improve various coordination scenarios and to then reach certain theoretical conclusions.
It will be possible to reach some conclusions after various troop exercises are held during the next few years, and the system will, most likely, be modified to some extent after such exercises. Final conclusions on the effectiveness of the new Armed Forces' command-headquarters structure will be made no sooner than 10-15 years from now, that is, after a new generation of senior officers accustomed to working within the new system emerges. Naturally, this is possible only if the current reform is implemented without any unexpected changes.
The financial issue
The effectiveness of a joint strategic command hierarchy depends on many factors, including defense spending levels. A day before the meeting, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev approved 22.5 trillion rubles' ($726 billion) worth of funding for the state arms procurement program, due to be implemented between 2011 and 2020. Of this sum, over 19 trillion rubles ($613 billion) will be disbursed by the Armed Forces, and the rest will go to other security-related agencies. In early summer 2010, it was noted that the program would receive 13 trillion rubles ($419.3 billion). The Defense Ministry said the amount was insufficient.
The 19 trillion ruble sum is an intermediate option. This summer, analysts said the Defense Ministry would need 36 trillion rubles ($1.16 trillion) to meet all of its requirements in the next decade.
The allocations will be primarily used to maintain combat-ready strategic nuclear forces and to upgrade air-force and air-defense equipment. The Navy is also expected to receive new weaponry. It appears that the army's re-equipment has been put off for a while, and that tank and motorized-rifle units will have to upgrade and overhaul available vehicles. Nevertheless, the army will receive some new equipment, primarily troop-control and communications systems without which any coordination between the services will be difficult.
This approach seems appropriate given that the country's limited potential calls for some sacrifices. Considering Moscow's current relations with its most powerful neighbors, namely, NATO in the west and China in the east, the threat of a hypothetical land war against a mighty enemy with modern weapons and equipment seems far-fetched. At the same time, local conflicts along Russia's southern borders, primarily in Central Asia, seem possible. Instead of up-to-date tanks, such conflicts will require a modern and effective troop-control system to keep casualties to a minimum.
Those responsible for the Buinaksk tragedy
The Board also discussed the reaction of the Armed Forces' top commanders to the September 4, 2010 terrorist act in Buinaksk, Dagestan. On that day, a car packed with explosives and driven by a suicide bomber was detonated near Buinaksk after ramming the gates of a military unit. Later, a second bomb exploded in Buinaksk on the route of the police officers heading to the site of the first blast. Five people were killed in the bombing, and dozens more wounded. After the Board's meeting, General Staff Chief Nikolai Makarov said the tragedy had been the result of irresponsible and slipshod attitudes of some officials, and that the Defense Ministry was drafting an order on relieving those being held responsible for the tragedy.
Although the Defense Ministry's stern reaction is justified, a decision to dismiss those responsible should be followed by tougher security measures, primarily in southern Russia. Moreover, the mental attitude of troops needs to be changed, so that such measures do not become yet another short-term campaign. The latter is much harder and will take more time to accomplish.
Whom to serve?
After the meeting, the Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and representatives of human-rights organizations discussed another important element of the military reform, specifically recruitment. This has been one of the most painful national issues in the past few years.
The Defense Minister has said again that it is impossible to increase the number of contract sergeants and soldiers for the lack of funds. Technically speaking, no one refuses to eventually increase the percent of contract soldiers. The Defense Ministry is expected to reexamine this issue after the Russian financial situation improves; all the more so as the Armed Forces continue to receive additional sophisticated equipment requiring skilled personnel.
The organization of military service and combat training for conscripts doing a 12-month stint remains a major army level problem. Some analysts believe that their service conditions have improved considerably in the past 10-15 years. However, the brutal hazing of young recruits remains a problem. In this situation, the proposal of the Defense Minister that human-rights activists accompany conscripts from draft boards to military units seems quite correct.
It should be noted that the Defense Ministry has no intention of extending the 12-month military service period because of political and social, rather than military factors. Twelve-month service plus far more intensive troop-training programs in an overwhelming majority of units make it possible to maintain combat readiness. An extended, two-year, military service period would drastically increase the number of draft-dodgers, analysts say.
The reform still has a long way to go. New military districts and joint strategic-command divisions still have to be finalized. Moreover, the system for training officers and sergeants needs to be upgraded and the percent of contract soldiers clarified. Obviously, the Defense Ministry has the required political will for continuing the reform and is trusted by the country's leaders. So, we should wait for its results.
RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
