During a meeting with his American counterpart Barack Obama in Seoul, President Dmitry Medvedev made a striking comment, calling the past three years “probably the best three years in Russian-U.S. relations in the past decade.” What made these years so remarkable? Perhaps it was that, for the first time in a long time, Russian and American diplomats made a genuine effort to bring their countries closer together. And it doesn’t matter that the results were mixed.
The best we could do?
Initially, some thought Medvedev had said “in recent decades,” but the transcript of Medvedev’s speech posted on his website made it clear that his claim was much more modest. He was referring to the period 2002-2012, or, generally speaking, the presidencies of George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, followed by those of Obama and Medvedev.
Of course, it wouldn’t be sufficient to evaluate in isolation these three years, which started with the “reset” and ultimately revealed how complex our bilateral relations are.
Medvedev and Obama have met 11 times since their first meeting on April 1, 2009. They reflected on the results of their efforts in Seoul, where they were attending a nuclear security summit.
America has done itself a favor by facilitating Russia’s accession to the WTO – playing by the same rules in trade is the best deal for everyone. They haven’t settled the issues of missile defense in Europe or the Middle East, but have signed and ratified the strategic offensive arms reduction treaty. It’s worth noting that the idea to come to terms on deployed medium-range arms and stockpiles originated in Seoul.
These may not seem like major achievements, but to accurately judge the success of these three years we must understand what each side sought to achieve. If the goal was to ignite a passionate Russian-American love affair, the WTO and New START seem like meager results. But if the goal was more modest, then everything is OK.
It is possible to ignore each other
I took part in a conference in Kent near London in 2000. Thomas Graham, a prominent ideologist of the Republican administration, proclaimed in an unwavering voice the tenets of his administration’s policy toward Russia. The gist of his speech was that Russia no longer played the role in the world it used to play in the past, and from now on Washington would deal with it at the level of deputy department heads, and only when time permits.
This message shocked the Brits, the hosts of the meeting, most of all. Does this mean an end to the all-embracing democratization of Russia that was carried out under President Bill Clinton? My response to Graham was different: I thought it was great that they were finally planning to leave us alone, all the more so since any new Russian government would resist pressure – they had already democratized us to the limit.
The George W. Bush administration followed Graham’s prescriptions. America even considered itself powerful enough to ignore the advice of its European allies. It sought regime change in the “Axis of Evil” and was imposing absurd, albeit pro-American regimes (Georgia and Ukraine), on the Russian perimeter, promising to eventually get them into NATO. This threat looked serious.
Vladimir Putin’s response essentially boiled down to this: We are already strong and independent enough to say, without impunity, whatever we want about America, and sometimes we can also do what we like.
This was an exhausting and thrilling page in the history of world diplomacy. Moscow’s calculation proved to be surprisingly accurate – everyone realized by 2005 that the United States had overestimated its “omnipotence” and was headed to the edge of a precipice. On the contrary, Russia had regained its status as an independent world power, lost under the previous president.
By the end of the presidencies of Putin and Bush, bilateral relations appeared to be at an impasse. But in reality the two countries had simply lost touch with each other. They did not want to see or hear each other.
The search for common values
Tensions came to a head in August 2008, when Georgia attacked what was formally its own territory at that time – South Ossetia. Its troops started killing Ossetian civilians, and Russian peacekeepers deployed there. A decision to make a military response to Georgia’s punitive operation was made by the new president, Medvedev, while Putin merely informed his old friend George W. Bush about this. Bush nodded gloomily – there was nothing he could say.
It does not matter that Tbilisi launched this attack against U.S. advice, as it turned out later. This moment signified the final collapse of the already shaken status of America as the “sole superpower,” and this was before the economic crisis, which was still over a month away.
Thus, President Obama had to act as a crisis manager, whereas Medvedev was positioned as the leader of a country that had consolidated itself beyond any wildest imagination. This allowed them to speak as equals. But it was not enough just to start talking – this would have happened in any event. There was more to the “the best three years.” Medvedev and Obama sincerely sought friendship between their countries. They searched for issues on which they could cooperate with an open heart rather than against their will.
But this is where the real problem lies. In both countries, foreign policy relies on the support of society, which means it cannot change dramatically. So, where did that leave us?
Yes to cooperation on Afghanistan. But will we cooperate after America withdraws its troops from that country? This remains to be seen. On Iran we are cooperating to the greatest extent possible. As long as Obama is for negotiations, as he reaffirmed in Seoul, everything is fine, but there will be problems if he changes his mind. As for Libya, Moscow did not prevent the destruction of that country, which did not help the approval rating of Medvedev, who had to decide whether he should run for a second term (with a predictable outcome).
As for Syria, in general we understand each other and admit off the record that reconciliation and not regime change is what’s needed. But on the record the United States says otherwise.
As for trade, we have neglected each other for too long, and it will take a long time to boost trade. For the time being, we are not bound by economic ties, and, therefore, we do not have to display caution.
But in general –- and especially compared to the first years of the decade – the state of bilateral relations seems fairly good. Now we just have to keep our foot on the gas.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s and may not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
