Psychological intimidation of Iran will lead to a new war

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In the last few months, a large-scale psychological war has been launched against Iran. Respectable Western publications are carrying intimidating reports about Iran's military plans, its success in developing nuclear weapons and its terrorist schemes. Is this strategy justified and does it increase the likelihood of a new war in the Middle East?

In the last few months, a large-scale psychological war has been launched against Iran. Respectable Western publications are carrying intimidating reports about Iran's military plans, its success in developing nuclear weapons and its terrorist schemes. Is this strategy justified and does it increase the likelihood of a new war in the Middle East?

Is America under threat of attack?

In mid-May the German Die Welt reported on the construction of an Iranian missile base near the city of Santa Ana de Coro, Venezuela. The report said that Iran will deploy medium-range missiles on this base and that nuclear-capable Iranian missiles could easily reach any target in the United States. In fact, this was a case of misinformation. Even if we assume that Iran has developed a nuclear warhead (which would take Iran at least two years under its most successful uranium program) and brought its Shahab-3 medium-range missiles into Venezuela, it would still be unable to deliver a strike even at the closest American state. The distance between the city of Maracaibo in Venezuela (the closest to the U.S.) and Miami is about 2,000 km. These missiles, especially with nuclear warheads made from weapons-grade uranium, are not capable of reaching that far.

Iran would not gain many advantages by bringing its Sajil-2 two-stage solid fuel missile to Venezuela. In this situation, the number of targets on U.S. territory would be very limited.

In late October, The Washington Times quoted the then vice president of the German Federal Intelligence Service as saying that "Iran had received two of the three nuclear warheads and medium-range nuclear delivery systems" that had gone missing in Kazakhstan. It was also reported that "Iran had purchased four 152 mm nuclear shells from the former Soviet Union, which were reportedly stolen and sold by former Red Army officers."

The newspaper went on to say that "The Revolutionary Guards now have more than 1,000 ballistic missiles, many of which are pointed at U.S. military bases in the Middle East and Europe." These facts are false. Neither the United States, nor any other country has proved any cases of Soviet nuclear warheads having been stolen in the 1990s.

Only ICBMs were deployed in Kazakhstan. Considering this, Iran's medium-range missiles could not deliver nuclear warheads even into Israeli territory. But even if a nuclear warhead were hypothetically stolen, it is technically impossible to maintain it in proper working order without replacing certain components for even a decade.

Pursuing the same strategy of psychological warfare, American prosecutors charged two ethnic Iranians on October 11 in a plot to assassinate a Saudi ambassador. They were suspected to be linked with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and allegedly planned to kill the Saudi ambassador in Washington and stage other acts of terror on the territory of Saudi and Israeli embassies. Later on, U.S. President Barack Obama and State Secretary Hillary Clinton also joined the choir of accusations against Iran.

The November 2011 report by the IAEA director-general on the status of Iran's nuclear program can also be considered an element of psychological pressure. The appendix to this report quotes confidential information on Iran's applied nuclear military research. Iran's activities in this sphere until 2003 (the beginning of the crisis over its nuclear program) have been thoroughly studied.

In 2002-2003 Iranian specialists carried out Project 111 on the modernization of the Shahab-3 rocket, in an attempt to shape uranium into a spherical warhead. This information is not entirely new. However, its dissemination in the media led to excessive tensions and effectively blocked the talks on the existing problem.

The veracity of facts that refer to later dates is cause for serious doubts. First, these facts were taken from a limited number of sources, and second, the Iranians' activities were not of an obviously military nature (in most cases, the report reviewed dual technology).

The exposed undeclared nuclear materials were not weapons-grade, and their amount, in IAEA terminology, cannot be considered "substantial" (25 kg for uranium enriched by over 20%). Therefore, the majority of Russian experts believe the UN Security Council has no serious grounds for imposing new sanctions against Iran.

Israel is ready. Or is it?

In early November Israeli President Shimon Peres announced his country's readiness to deal a blow to Iranian nuclear facilities for the first time. At the same time, Israel staged large-scale civil defense exercises. According to some sources, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak began consultations with their government colleagues on resolving Iran's nuclear problem by force.

This is further evidence of the continued psychological warfare against Iran, since at present it poses neither a nuclear nor a missile threat to Israel.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF), commonly known in Israel by the Hebrew acronym Tzahal, do not yet have the necessary potential capable of the assured destruction of Iran's 15 nuclear facilities. Nor has it completed the formation of its four-echelon missile defense system either. It will adopt counter-missiles of its upper (exoatmospheric) echelon, which allow a second attempt to intercept a ballistic missile warhead, no sooner than 2013. The defense's third echelon - David's Sling - is still in the R&D phase.

All these factors tangibly reduce the efficiency of Israel's national missile defense, even if it is potentially strengthened by American ground-based THAAD and sea-based Aegis systems.

Potential scenarios

There are two possible development scenarios concerning Iran's nuclear program.

The first involves a Russian and Chinese veto on new UN Security Council sanctions against Iran. In this case the United States and its allies would increase their pressure on Iran by expanding the existing unilateral sanctions. Iran would continue cooperating with the IAEA but would limit its scope as it becomes politicized.

This scenario is the most likely. It does not lead to any disastrous consequences, but allows Iran to approach closer to the red line, beyond which the development of nuclear weapons will become a strictly political issue.

The second scenario involves an Israeli missile attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. At this point we return to the reasons for this decision. It depends not so much on the reality of Iran's nuclear threat as on the domestic political developments in Israel and events in the surrounding region, both of which are highly complicated and explosive.

Considering Israel's decision-making practices, it's clear that even its loyal ally, the United States, would not be able to prevent it from making such a move. Israel would simply face the Americans and the rest of the world community with a fait accompli. Subsequent developments will depend entirely on Washington's position. If it supports Israel by dealing a disarming strike at Iran, then the Middle East will be plunged into a regional war with unpredictable consequences. If Washington abstains from military action after Israel's strike, Iran will develop nuclear weapons as quickly as they possibly can. This may encourage Saudi Arabia and probably Turkey to go nuclear as well.

It is very hard to predict when Israel might deal a blow at Iranian facilities but this scenario is becoming increasingly realistic.

In summary, the psychological intimidation of Iran is becoming increasingly dangerous. Nobody wants a new war in the region but this is becoming more and more likely. It is still possible to stop this process but both Israel and Iran must recognize the need to do so.

Vladimir Yevseyev is director of the Center for Social and Political Research

The views expressed in this article are the author's and may not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

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